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THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF AUDIT OPINION SPACE
Seongjae Yu, University of Illinois
Auditing is essentially a decision process, ultimately reaching an
auditor's opinion as to the overall fairness of the financial reporting.
Currently, there are four opinion alternatives available to the auditor,
one of which he must choose at the end of his examination. These opinions
were promulgated by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) in the form of
a descriptive model and are well accepted by the public and the S.E.C.
Various attempts have been made to use decision science techniques to
improve the audit process. Arkin [3], Neter [14], Elliott and Rogers [8],
and Roberts [15] were concerned with the usefulness of the classical sta-
tistical sampling techniques. Birnberg [4], Sorensen [17], Tracy [19], and
Corless [6] tried to apply Bayesian sampling techniques. More recently,
Ijiri and Kaplan [11] attempted to use a goal programming approach to
satisfy the multiple goals of an auditor's sampling, while Yu and Neter [20]
used a stochastic concept to evaluate the reliability of the internal control
system. On the other hand Davis [7] explored the usefulness of the network
technique in planning an audit program.
All of this research was concerned with more efficient audit processes
in generating evidence. Little research has been done on how the evidence
and information so obtained can be used to reach an audit opinion decision.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model that will reveal the
relationship between the audit opinion parameters or factors that affect an
audit opinion and the AICPA' s four audit opinion alternatives. The opinion
parameters are first identified and an attempt is then made to define the
parameters in quantitative terms. The quantified parameters are then considered

basis vectors generating an audit opinion space which is partitioned into
four mutually exclusive subspaces, each representing one of the opinion
alternatives. The auditor's utility function is related to the determination
of the partitioning criteria of the audit opinion space. The resulting
model expressed in mathematical terms is based on the AICPA's descriptive
model set forth in the Statement on Audit Standards No. 1 [2].
The significance of this study is threefold: (1) it develops a means
to quantify various dimensions of an item that is considered significant
for the audit purpose. The quantified measures of an item in multiple dimen-
sional terms would enable the auditor to systematically handle the effect of
the various significant items in audit, (2) it attempts for the first time
to provide a basis for a theoretical explanation of the profession's practices
with regard to the audit opinion decision, and (3) it may provide a useful
step toward a formal decision-theoretic approach in auditing.
Alternatives of Audit Opinions
According to the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 of the AICPA,
there are four opinion alternatives avr Liable to an auditor, one of which
must be issued at the conclusion of an audit. They are the unqualified
opinion , the qualified opinion , the adverse opinion , and the disclaimer of
opinion
. Although the meaning of these different alternatives are well
known, the basic definitions are given below because they are the models on
which theory of this paper is constructed.
Unqualified opinion . This opinion, sometimes referred to as a "clean
opinion," is issued on the financial statements when the independent auditor
has formed the opinion, that on the basis of an examination made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, the presentation of the financial

statements, taken as a whole, is fair, in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles applied on a consistent basis and includes all informa-
tive disclosures necessary to make the statements not misleading.
Qualified opinion . This opinion modifies the unqualified opinion by
stating that the financial statements, taken as a whole, are presented fairly
with certain exception, the effects of which are material enough that they
may not be ignored. The exceptions may arise due to departures from either
generally accepted auditing standards or generally accepted accounting
principles, or due to inconsistent application of accounting principles,
inadequate disclosure of information, or uncertainty as to the state of nature.
The effect of the exception, though material, can be localized in its relation
to the other parts of the financial statements so as not to impair the overall
fairness.
Adverse opinion . This is the opposite of an unqualified opinion: it
is an opinion that the financial statements do not present fairly the financial
position, results of operations, or changes in financial position in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles. This opinion is required in
any auditor's report when exceptions are. so significantly material that, in
the auditor's judgment, a qualified opinion is not justified; that is, the
effects of the exceptions are so pervasive that the overall fairness of the
financial statements, taken as a whole, is definitely destroyed.
Disclaimer of opinion . When the auditor was unable to accumulate
sufficient competent evidential matter to form an opinion on the financial
statements, he should so state through a disclaimer of opinion. The necessity
of disclaiming an opinion may arise either from a serious limitation on the
scope of examination or from the existence of unusual uncertainties concerning
the amount of an item or the outcomes of a matter materially affecting financial

statements causing the auditor not to be able to form an opinion on the
statements taken as a whole.*
The four alternatives promulgated by the AICPA are in the form of a
descriptive model, focusing on the concept of fair presentation of financial
statements. In very simplistic terms, the four opinions may be stated as
follows: An unqualified opinion is issued when the auditor is convinced,
upon completing an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, that the financial statements are fairly presented; on the other
hand, an adverse opinion is issued when the auditor is convinced that the
statements are not presented fairly. A disclaimed opinion is issued when
the auditor has little or no basis to judge the fairness of the financial
statement due to his ignorance (or uncertainty) as to the states of nature
surrounding the financial statements. The qualified opinion, which is
basically a modified unqualified opinion having an element of unfairness or
uncertainty in the financial statements, falls somewhere between these three
opinions.
Despite the fact that the concept of fair presentation of the financial
statements is the focal point of the auditor's opinion, the literature does
not provide a clear-cut meaning of fair presentation. The AICPA defines the
concept indirectly by listing five criteria circumstances where fair presenta-
tion of the financial statements is deemed impaired. In the absence of the
circumstances the auditor may conclude that the financial statements under
audit are fairly presented.
The five circumstances are:
1. The scope of the auditor's examination is limited or affected;
*For a detailed discussion of these four opinions, see the AICPA [2],
pp. 80-83.

2. Unusual uncertainties exist concerning future developments, the
effect of which cannoc be reasonably estimated or otherwise re-
solved satisfactorily;
3. The financial statements ere 1 ;t presented in coefirmity with
generally accepted accounting principles;
A. Accounting principles are not consistently applied;
5. Informative disclosure of qualitative and quantitative information
is not adequately made.
When an auditor finds a significant item or event during his examination,
his mind undergoes a quick thought process,- such as running through a
decision table, as follows: Is this item in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles; is the item treated consistently; should
the item be disclosed; is all necessary evidence related to the item obtain-
able without the client's interference; and is there any unusual uncertainty
related to the item? These questions clearly imply that any significant
item or event does potentially have five aspects corresponding to the five
circumstances listed above. Here
s
we make three observations: (1) the
item or event may be subject to mere than one circumstance, (?.) each
circumstance may have a varying degree of seriousness, and (3) there could
be many significant items or events in a, financial statement that need
scrutiny simultaneously frcn tee view of tne five circumstances. These
observations, though chcy aiay "praar trivial, provide a set of bases for the
development of the theory in this ei^er.
Strictly speaking, ell asourtions in the financial statements and the
related events thereon should be cerofu.lly examined for their potential
sensitivity to the five criteria circumstances. But, for all practical
purposes, most of the assertions and events are verified beyond reasonable
doubt as to their conformity with the conditions supporting the "unqualified"
•'The AICPA [1], pp. 98-123.

opinion. Only a relatively limited number of assertions and events are
potential candidates as those significant items that may force tha auditor
to consider other than an unqualified opinion. In this paper, we define
E^ 1=1, 2, ••', n, as the potential candidates for significant items, and
show how they influence the choice of the auditor's opinion alternatives.
A question that immediately arises is whether the auditor should
always issue an opinion other than unqualified whenever one or more of the
circumstances are present in any E^. The literature suggests that the
answer depends on the seriousness of E^'s. That is, the audit opinion to
be issued must be determined by considering the Interface of the set of
significant events E^, i=l, 2, *'*, n, having varying degrees of seriousness
in terms of the five criteria circumstances, with the auditor's criteria
functions, which presumably reflect his utility function.
Model of the Auditor's Opinion Space
We now construct the auditor's opinion space, in which the interface
can be depicted. First, we define three distinctive parameters as inherent
elements In the five circumstances, eac' parameter representing a basis vector.
Secondly, each specific event E^ will be measured in terms of the three para-
meters, just as in geometry a point in space is measured in terms of three
axes, X, Y, and Z. Since auditors currently do not have quantified measure-
ment units with respect to the parameters, we define the units in quantitative
terms possessing a certain desirable property.
Our objective is to provide a means to express various events E^ in
common denominators so that they can be systematically related to the audit
opinion decision criteria function.
Parameter 1; Uncertainty as to the State of Nature . Auditing is an

attestation to the credibility of management's assertions embodied in the
financial statements. The assertions are management ' s claims concerning the
state of nature that prevails with respect to the company's financial
position, results of operations, and changes in financial position. The
credibility of an assertion should be rubntantiated by evidence collected
and evaluated by the auditor. If the auditor cannot obtain enough evidence,
he is necessarily uncertain and uncomfortable because he has less than
convincing knowledge as co the state of nature surrounding those assertions.
The auditor's immediate goal is to obtain as much evidence as practical to
decrease the degree of uncertainty to acceptable bounds. But as in any other
field that is concerned with evidence, auditing is subject to various limita-
tions in its effort to collect evidence. One limitation is the audit scope
imposed by tne management or by factors like cost, tine, or other conditions
which preclude the use of auditing procedures considered necessary in the
circumstances. Another limitation the auditor face3 is temporal in nature.
To the extent accounting principles rely on the going-concern assumption, the
auditor has to make seme prognostication as to future events and outcomes on
che basis of evidence nov available to him. Uncertainties concerning future
developments necessarily leave che auditor in a certain stage of ignorance as
to the state of nature surrounding the financial statements. Pending law suits
or exact bad debt counts are typical examples. An examination of the five
circumstances that rerui'tc :ae auditor to d2nart from the unqualified opinion
suggests that che first two—limitation on audit scope and uncertainties about
future developmeatn—may new be summarized and represent but one parameter:
the degree of uncertainty as to "he state of nature associated with the
financial report.
The degree of uncertainty is inversely related to the degree of sufficiency

8and competency of the evidence. The more sufficient and competent evidence
the auditor has, the less uncertain he can be. For example, assume that the
auditor finds a significant item E^ in the financial statements. The auditor
then obtains evidence to determine the true state of nature with respect to
E^. What the evidence reveals, however, may or may not correspond to the
true 3tate of nature. In general, the reliability of evidence is at best
probabilistic. Under the current 3tate of art in auditing whether the evidence
is sufficient and competent enough to reveal the true state of nature is, in
most cases, a matter of professional judgment. This professional judgment may
be expressed in terms of the auditor's subjective probability.* Let such a
probability be denoted as p(Ej_) . Then a measure of the uncertainty, denoted
as U, associated with the evidence with respect to E^, may be defined ao:
i
j.
U « log ; :— * ,, v
p(Ei) (1)
which increases from to °° as p(Ei) decreases from 1 to 0. This is a
monotone function. Notice that it is the measure of information in communi-
cation theory [16]. This measure is consistent with the theory of audit
evidence: when the auditor has less evidence, his perception as to the state
of nature should be more uncertain—-this inverse relation is represented by
equation (1). The logarithmic function allows us to easily manipulate U,
which will be shown later.
Parameter 2: Monetary Effects . Most of the exceptional circumstances
that concern the auditor can be measured in monetary terms. The two conspicuous
circumstances identified by the AICPA are the departure from generally accepted
accounting principles and the violation of the principle of consistency. Since
*The subjective probability may vary from auditor to auditor. But the
AICPA' s "generally accepted auditing standards" provide a set of criteria which,
if followed, helps minimize divergence of such probability. The subjectivity
of the probability does not hinder the model development. Our concern is the
quantification of such subjective assessment of the quality of evidence.

the effects of these events are measured in monetary terms, the two circum-
stances may be treated under one common denominator: the monetary effect.
This second parameter can also accommocate other unusual events such as
contingent liabilities, the effect of merging under a "pooling of interests,"
and the effect of nationalization of a subsidiary by a foreign government.
The auditing problem is to determine how significant the monetary effects
of these unusual events should be before the auditor seriously considers
choosing other opinions. It is the problem of "materiality." Despite the
daily use of the concept of materiality in every audit, auditors are devoid
of a reliable measure that can be used as a reference in determining whether
an item is material. In his empirical study Frishkoff [9] identified two
materiality criteria variables that significantly influence audit opinions:
one is the ratio of an item to net income, and the other is the ratio of an
item to the "net worth." One way of combining these two variables is to
create an index M as follows:
e
M vi __i_
' NI
+ v2
e
i I, (2)
NW i
where e^ is the monetary effect of event E^ in question, NI represents net income
(NI^O) , NW represents the net worth (NW^O) , and v- and v2 represent relative
weights satisfying the conditions V]_ > 0, v > 0, and Vi + v2 = 1. The measure
M is always positive and is a monotone function; its magnitude reflects the
degree of seriousness of the exceptional item in relation to the net income
and size of the company. This approach avoids Hick's criticism [10] of using
the net income as a sole materiality criterion: M is less volatile because of
its association with a stable basis of the net worth. Moreover, once M is obtained,
it becomes a relative measure independent of the size of the company.*
*We may add other criteria variables in measuring M. See [21] for other
variables. Which criteria variables and what relative weights should be used
is not a main concern in this paper. They shall be determined by individual
auditors. What is concerned is that M be an index, measuring consistently and
systematically the degree of materiality.
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Parameter 3: Disclosure . The last circumstance the AICPA identifies as a
condition under which the auditor may have to choose other than an unqualified
opinion relates to the adequacy of informative disclosure. Recognizing that not
all financial infoimation can be reduced to a set of numbers in financial state-
ments, additional information, both qualitative and quantitative, needs to be
supplied in order not to mislead financial statements users. Auditors do not
have any systematic means of measuring the degree of adequacy of disclosure.
Assuming the objective of disclosure is to disseminate information so
that investors will not be misled, the quality of a disclosure may be expressed
in terms of its ability to reduce the probability of misleading investors. This
leads to the idea of information theory used by Theil [18]. Assume an event
E± that may need disclosure to prevent investors from being misled. Assume also
that the auditor believes the probability of misleading the investors without
disclosure of E^ is r(E^), and the probability of misleading the investors with
disclosure of Ej[ is q(E^) . Then by definition > disclosure should occur when
rCEj^) £. q(E^). The information content associated with event E^ without dis-
closure of the event is then measurad (according to information theory) as
log (l/r(Ei)); and the information cont_mt associated with event E^ with its
disclosure is log (l/q(Ej)). Given the additivity of the information concept,
an obvious way of defining the quantity of information associated with the
particular disclosure on E^ is:
i 1 , 1 , l(E-t) ,.,->l087u7T " lo * ^i5J - l0^ftr (3)
This is a measure showing how much the disclosure helps reduce the probability
of misleading. It is always non-positive for r(E^) >, q(Ej) : the negative sign
is understandable because disclosure with q(E^) contributes negatively to the
chance of misleading. But the disclosure which helps r-3duc3 the probabilities
of misleading from r(Ei) to q(E^) gives no definite clue as to the question of
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whether the disclosure will ultimately mislead investors. If investors are
ultimately misled, the information value of the disclosure is log (q(Ei)/r(E.j_))
.
The disclosure states that the chance of misleading, and hence also the chance
of log (q(E.»)/r(Ej)) bits cf information, is q(E^). Therefore, we can
obtain the expected information of the disclosure which transforms the
probabilities of misleading from r(E^) to q(E^) as follows:
D(q(Ei):r(Ei)) « q(E± ) log |$|t+(1 - 0(2,)) log jfcgg^ (4)
Notice that D which is a monotone function is always positive except for the
case where r(E^) = q(Ei), in which case D = 0. ;': This is consistent with the
idea of disclosure because if a disclosure does not help reduce the chance of
misleading the value of the disclosure is naturally nil. But, in general,
disclosure, by definition, has some positive value.
Case of Multiple Events
To this point we have identified three distinctive parameters affecting
singly or in combination the auditor's opinion and we have defined them in
quantitative terms; all of these quantitative terms take values ranging from
to <*.
The definitions of U. M, and D so far have all been made on a single event,
E^ But audits of many ordinary financial statements encounter a number of
unusual events, each subject to different quantities of 0, M, and D. The
auditor must consider all of these Items cf differing levels of importance
and decide upon the most desirable opinion. A model of audit opinion space
3hould then presuppose a means of aggregating in a systematic and meaningful
way the different parameter values o£ different events E^, i=l, 2, •••, n, in
such a way that the relative importance of E± ±3 properly taken care of.
*For a more general discussion, see H. Theil [131, pp. 460-461 t:nd 3. Lev
[12], pp. 18-20.
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One way of aggregating the effects of individual events Is a linear
combination. By design, the parameters U, M, and D have been constructed so
as to permit the use of a linear combination. Let the events the auditor
considers unusual be E«,..., E-^..., E^; without losing generality, it may
be assumed they are independent events. Let the monetary effects associated
with these unusual events be e^ , . .
.
, e-[,..., en , respectively, and let the
relative weight of c± be w.^, where
u± = j.
cl
l , i = 1, 2,..., n. (5)
The combined effect of e^'", e
n on M, using the property of the linear
aggregation of monetary information in accounting, can be expressed from
formula (2) as follows:
M = v±
£
l
e*l + v2
E
l ei l (6)
|ni| |nw|
The combined effects of *!»"'> e^ on U and D are, from formulas (1) and (4)
and the independence assumption, expressed as follows:
U « Ewi log —^—
,
(7)
P(2i)
D = Ewi qfEi) log q(Ei> + Zw± (l-q(Ei)) log ^^
r(E±) l-r(Ei). (8)
This linear combination is, of course, justified by the additivity property of
the information concept mentioned earlier. The use of the monetary effect e^
as the means of determining the relative weight of event Ei and hence determining
D and U, may be subject tc some criticism. If there is a very important
qualitative event that may have negligible immediate monetary effect (negligible
e^)
, such an event, under equation (8), has little effect on the measurement
of D, even if the important event is well disclosed. If that is the case,
the index D is not a proper measure of the quality of disclosure. This
criticism is understandable. However, the truth of the matter is, that
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if the auditor genuinely believes the monetary effect is negligible, he should
not be bothered with the disclosure of the event. The fact that he considers
the event important (even if its immediate monetary effect i3 negligible)
signifies the auditor's perception that the potential monetary effect is
material. The inference is that the auditor should always try to estimate
the potential monetary effect. Whether the estimation is reliable is irrelevant
as far as the determination of M is concerned. The reliability of such
estimation is independently taken care of by the first parameter U.
So far we have recognized the three attributes of event E^ and defined
them as three audit opinion parameters. Also we have discussed ways of
expressing them in quantitative terms i.e., U, M, and D. Thus, we have
provided three basis vectors to define a three dimensional audit opinion
space. Furthermore, we have considered means to combine the effects of
multiple events E^, E2» ,,, J En on U, M, and D. In any given audit engagement,
the auditor computes for each E^, i=l, 2,**', n, three numbers corresponding
to three parameters and combine the respective numbers to come out with overall
indexes U, M, and D. This forms a vector.
Our next task is to relate the four audit opinion alternatives to this
three dimensional space. The motivation for this effort is twofold: One ij
to show the interrelationships between the parameters, the opinion alternatives,
and the auditor's utility function. Specifically, we will partition the 3pace
into four subsets corresponding to the four audit alternatives. Another motiva-
tion is to show how a specific vector obtained in an audit engagement can be
used in determining an audit opinion.
Partition of Parameter Space
U, M, and D defined above are, in fact, continuous variables having the
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range [0, °°) . We can conceive of each variable as having a range which is
partitioned into four subsets, representing the unqualified opinion, qualified
opinion, adverse opinion, and disclaimer of opinion, respectively. Let u^,
u2, U3, u^ represent subset intervals of U, each denoting a set that correspond
to one of four opinions. These subsets are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive when the other tv;o conditions, M and D, are given. This uniqueness
condition of each subset is obvious because no one point should be classified
in more than one opinion's subsets when the other conditions are held constant.
The same concept is applicable to M and D. From this analysis we propose the
following basic statement:
Statement 1
. Let u^ m^, d i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, each representing one
of the four opinions) be subsets of U, M, and D respectively, where
U, M, and D are audit parameters as discussed earlier. Then:
(a) Given mi!!! and d t D, U may be partitioned so that:
4 4
U u* - T, Q u±
i-1 i=l
(b) Given u t U and d $ D, M may be partitioned so that:
4 4
U mi «= T, n m. =
i-1 i»l
(c) Given m t M and u t U, D may be partitioned so that:
4 4
u di - T, Q d-j_ - t
t-1 i-1
where T represents the total set and the empty set.
According to the AICPA's descriptive model of audit opinions an unqualified
opinion ideally should be issued when U and M are both kept at a minimum and D
at a maximum. Alternatively, V7hen U and K are large or D is small, the auditor
should consider issuing a qualified opinion; and when U and M are "significantly"
large or D is "unusually" small, the auditor should issue an adverse opinion or
disclaim an opinion. This implies that there are certain transitive relations
among the alternatives of opinions. On the basis of (a) the AICPA's descriptive
model, (b) "Statement 1" above, and (c) the fact that U, M, and D are all
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monotone functions, we propose a second basic statement:
Statement 2 . Let u. , m^, d^ (1=1, 2, 3, A, each representing one
of the four opinions) be subsets c* U, M, and D respectively. Then:
(a) Given m t M and d t D,
{u t ni) < {u t u?} < in t (U3 U U4)}
(b) Given u t U and d .' D,
{m t mi} < {m E! m2"; < (m t (1K3 VJ 1114)}
(c) Given u 2 U and m $ M,
{d ^ dx } > {d 2 d 2 ) >{d2 (d3 \) d^)}
Functional Relations Between Parameters
The exact functional relationship of the three parameters to the four alter-
native audit opinions cannot be determined because of the lack of empirical
data available under the measurement scheme proposed in this paper. However,
we can intuitively theorize the general relationship by using the descriptive
model assumed in the auditing literature. More formal theoretical support will
follow once this relationship is understood.
Relationship between opinions and U, H, when D=d . For presentation purposes,
only two parameters will be considered at a time, starting with the measures of
ignorance (or uncertainty), U, and the monetary effects, M. From various
definitions in audit opinions and related discussions, we know that if the effect
of an item in question is material (M > mj_ in Figure 1) and evidence of it is
well substantiated (U = in Figure 1) , the auditor will choose a qualified
opinion. Alternatively, when M » m? (which is less than m-^) but U = ui
(signifying uncertainty as to the true effect of m2 ) , then he will still choose
a qualified opinion because of the uncertainty associated with m^. This relation-
ship may be expressed as a negatively sloped line 0^ in Figure 1. A similar
argument can be made with respect to O2, where the intercept on the M-axis
(013) is normally referred to in the literature as "significantly material."
Notice that the line O3 distinguishes a space between the adverse opinion and
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disclaimer of opinion, where the former occupies space representing significant
materiality with convincing evidence or low U, and the latter representing
significant materiality with high uncertainty or high U. Notice also that
all three lines are negatively sloped, depicting the trade-off relations
between materiality and uncertainty.
U
X : f(U,M: D=d) =
,0
2
: g(U,M: D=d) =
Disclaimer space
3
: h(U,M: D=d) =
Figure 1
Relationship between uncertainty, materiality, and the audit opinions.
Relationship between opinions and U, D, when M m^ . In Figure 2, opinion
spaces are projected on the U and D dimension space when M = ra^, where n> was
implied as a material amount in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows us that even in the
case of a material item, if U is low (good evidence) and D is large (an excep-
tionally good disclosure), then an unqualified opinion may be issued. (e.g., a
pending litigation where a loss is very definite on the basis of subsequent events
information and the case is well disclosed). The figure also shows us that when
U and D are both low (low level of uncertainty as to the nature of M but with
unsatisfactory disclosure), an adverse opinion is due if M is very large. The
other two opinions may be explained similarly. The shape of the curves is chosen
a priori because we reason that the marginal effect of disclosure changes first at
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an increasing rate; but once a certain level of U is reached, the marginal
effect of disclosure changes at a decreasing rate. This is intuitively appealing
since, at a high level of uncertainty as to the state of nature, disclosure itself
becomes obscure and ineffective.
3
: h'(U,D: M«m4 )
Disclaimer
space
2
: g'(U,D: M=m4 ) =
r
: f '(U,D: M=m4 ) =
Figure 2
Relationship between uncertainty, disclosure, and the audit opinions
Relationship between opinions snd B, M, when IW . In Figure 3, opinions
are projected on the D and M dimension where U = u, and u is assumed to be
small. Notice that at small u, or a low uncertainty level, the disclaimer space
is not shown because the auditor is not allowed to disclaim when he has definite
evidence on which to determine whether or not the financial statements are
fairly presented. At a higher level of U, however, the projection will show
the disclaimer space instead of the adverse space. The shape of the curves
shows that the effect of materiality may be alleviated by improving the
level of disclosure.
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Unqual
.
space
m,
yO^. f"(D,M: u=u) »
Quai.
space
m
3
Figure 3
*^
2 : g"(D,M: U=u) =
Adverse
space
M
Relationship between disclosure, materiality, and the audit opinions
Partition of Opinion Space
Having investigated some basic concepts underlying audit opinions, we can
now make an overall statement concerning audit opinion alternatives and the
parameters in terms of the audit opinion vector space.
Suppose there is a three-dinensional vector space generated by basis vectors
U, M, and D with the operations of a positive scalar. This space is equivalent
to the first octant in a three-dimensional space. Any point in this vector
space can be represented by a vector, (u g u, m t M, and d t D) . From "Statement 1"
and "Statement 2," we can conceive a set of points partitioning between u± and
Uj
,
(i, j=l, 2, 3, 4 and i j> j). Let this point be called a boundary point
and denoted as u£j • For examoie, u£ 2 represents c point In U that delineates
between the unqualified and the qualified. From "Statement 1" a point u±a is
uniquely determined when ra t M and d t D are given. Similarly, we can conceive
unique boundary points rc£.« and d£.« in M and D, respectively. For example, m£ 2
and d£ 2 represent points In M and D, respectively, delineating the unqualified
and the qualified. A vector (u£ 2 , m£2 , d£2 ) then is a point in the audit opinion
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space delineating the unqualified opinion space and the qualified opinion
space. But there are many such vector sets uniquely determined out of the
simultaneous interplay of U, M, and D as partially demonstrated in Figures
1, 2, and 3. In fact, there are infinite sets since U, M, and D are all
continuous variables. For example, there is an infinite set (u£2 t U}
determined as D and M change from to »; similarly there are infinite seta
{m£2 t M} and {d£2 t D}. The vector sets {uf2, m£2 » <^12^ then constitute a
continuous surface partitioning betveen the unqualified opinion space and
the qualified. This surface may be functionally expressed as:
F (D, M, D) » (9)
By the same reasoning, we can conceive sets of vectors that uniquely de-
termine surfaces partitioning the qualified opinion space and the adverse; the
qualified and the disclaimer, and the adverse and the disclaimer. These sur-
faces may be defined as:
G (D, M, D) - (10)
H (D, M, D) - (ID
K (U, M, D) » 0, (12)
respectively. But from "Statement 2," there is no surface partitioning the
unqualified and the adverse or disclaimer.
Determination of the Boundary Sets {u£j , m£.« , df* }
Although the conceptual clarification of audit opinion has been made, a
formidable problem remains: How do we determine the partitioning surface vector
sets {u£j, m£j, d£u}. The discussion which follows is to show conceptually
how such vector sets could be obtained. The discussion provides a theoretical
basis for the discussions involving Figures 1, 2, and 3.
Suppose the auditor has obtained specific values for D, M, and D from an
actual audit engagement. For the given set of values, the auditor may issue any
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one of the four audit alternatives that would bring bin the most satisfaction.
Conceptually, the satisfaction from issuing a specific audit opinion may be
measured in terms of his reputation, tha effect on his revenues, the poseibilicy
of being sued by others, and the satisfaction to his client and the users of
his opinion. In other words, the auditor : s satisfaction is his utility which
may be expressed as a function of U, N, and D. Assume the auditor's satis-
faction from issuing an unqualified opinion is measured as follows:
V
x
-- V
x
(U, M, B). (IS)
Given a vector (u, m, d) , the auditor will have different satisfactions from
issuing a qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, and a disclaimed opinion.
Assume the respective satisfactions are measured by equations:
V"2 = V2 (U, M, D) : for issuing a qualified opinion
V3 = V3 (U, 11, D) : for issuing an adverse opinion
v4 = v4 (U, M, D) : for issuing a disclaimed opinion
(14)
(15)
(16)
To illustrate how the above equation V^, 1=1, 2, 3, 4, is related to the deter-
mination of the surfaces denoted by equation (9) , (1C) , (11) , and (14) , let u~
turn to Figure 4, where V^ is expressed as a continuous function of a single
variable M by holding U and D constant.
V: Utility
m
23 m24
m
3
Figure 4
Marginal utility curves corresponding to the four different opinions, with
respect to changes of materiality.
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The curves show the relationship between M and V^, which are intuitively appealing;
Holding the effects of U and D constant, when M is small such as mi, the auditor
would be most satisfied by issuing an unqualified opinion, but as M becomes large
the auditor would be more concerned with the unfavorable consequence of issuing
an unqualified opinion, i.e., his satisfaction will be diminishing (See V-j_ in
Figure 4). On the other hand, as M gets bigger the auditor would be more
comfortable by issuing a qualified opinion; once a certain point such as m2 is
reached, however, the magnitude of M becomes so large that he begins to worry
and his satisfaction with the qualified opinion will start to diminish (see V2)
.
When M is small, issuing an adverse opinion or disclaimer of opinion would bring
very little satisfaction to the auditor. (In fact, a negative satisfaction is
conceivable). But as M gets larger, the adverse opinion or the disclaimer becor" _
more justified and eventually at a point where M is very large such as m^, the
satisfaction would be indeed larger than the ones obtained from issuing an
unqualified or qualified opinion (see V3 and V4) . From the shapes of the curves,
it is apparent that Vj_, i=l, 2, 3, 4, can be interpreted as a marginal utility
function showing the change of his satisfaction or utility as M changes. Like
any other decision maker, the auditor would choose a course of action which
brings in more utility. Therefore, in Figure 4, the auditor will be most
satisfied by issuing an unqualified opinion between the interval (0, m-j^)
because (V^) > (V± ) , i=2, 3, 4, in that interval. Similarly he will be most
satisfied by issuing a qualified opinion between (m£2, 1J123) or (m12' m24^»*
by issuing an adverse opinion between (m^, °°) ; or by issuing a disclaimed
opinion between (m^, m ) . The relationship between V3 and V^ depends on the
other two parameters U and D, particularly U.
*Whether the interval is (tn-j^* raXo) or (^£2* m?4^ depends on the values of
the other two parameters. In any case the boundary point will be the one showing
higher utility value.
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The point m^., is a partitioning point between the unqualified and qualified,
because at the point, V, = V2 , i.e., the utility is the same. At this point Liu
auditor is indifferent whether he issues the unqualified opinion or qualifier
opinion. We know from "Statement 1" and "Statement 2" that m{ 2 will be different
at different U or D. Then the locus of m{2 in a three dimensional space will
form the surface partitioning the unqualified space and qualified space. In fact*.,
the curve 0^ in Figure 1 is such a locus of mfn in a two dimensional space wher'.
D is held constant. On the curve the auditor is indifferent between issuing an
unqualified opinion and a qualified opinion. In this sense the curve 0-^ is &a
V: Utility
Figure 5
Determination of a line AB partitioning between the unqualified and the
qualified opinion when uncertainty and materiality factors are used.
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"indifference curve."* The line AB in Figure 5 shows how the indifference
curve Oj or the locus m^ with respect to the change of U is obtained.
Similarly, all other curves in Figures 1, 2, and 3 represent curves showing
indifference to respective opinions. Extending to a three dimensional space
generated by U, M, and D, we can imagine "indifference surfaces" partitioning
opinion spaces.
In sum, the determination of the opinion boundary sets {u£j , m£j , d£j
}
can be made by setting
Vt - Vjs i,j = 1, 2, 3, 4, i*J. (17)
The locus of the set {u£j , nu j , d£j } satisfying the condition (17) above is the
"indifference surface" partitioning between opinions i and j . Equations (9)
,
(10), (11), and (12) represent such indifference surfaces.
Determination of an Opinion Alternative
Once the space partition is determined by the indifferent surfaces, the
process of the audit opinion selection becomes conceptually very much simplified.
The auditor must translate the set of significant events E^, i=l, 2,..., n, into
a vector in the audit opinion space and see in which subspace the tip of the
vector falls. For example, if the tip falls within the qualified space, then
the auditor issues a qualified opinion; if the tip falls within the adverse
space, then he issues an adverse opinion—and so forth. By doing so, the auditor
is assured to maximize his utility.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the audit opinions can be mathematically
*The term "indifference curve" should not be confused with the term used in
the micro-economic theory, where the concept of indifference is used with respect
to utility. In this paper the term Indifference is used with respect to the two
alternative opinions.
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modeled. Undoubtedly, the ideas expressed need further development and
sophistication. From the model, however, we observe a few interesting charac-
teristics, as compared to the conventional approach, regarding some aspects
of the audit opinion decision process. First, the model recognizes the
multiple attributes of event Ej_ and expresses it in three dimensional terms.
Each represents a specific dimension. This allows the auditor to systematically
translate the effect of various events Ej, i=l, 2,..., n, into common
denominators, expressed in the form of a vector. The auditor determines his
audit opinion on the basis of this vector as opposed to the conventional
approach in which each effect of the individual events on the opinion is more
or less separately taken.
Second, the use of the model does not preclude the use of the auditor's
judgment. Judgment is indispensable in auditing; but the use of judgment under
the model is directed to individual items such as the determination of p(E^),
r(E^), qCEO, e^, and V.. This means that the judgment tends to be more reliable
and less erratic as the auditor deals with more specific, isolated items. A
more complex judgment such as the interrelations of the individual items and their
consequences are aided by the model.
A third interesting derivative that is observed from the model is that the
meaning of materiality in auditing may possibly be subject to a new interpretation,
A well accepted definition of materiality says that "an item should be regarded
as material if there is reason to believe that knowledge of it would influence
the decisions of an informed investor"[l, p . 8] . The definition emphasizes the
importance of the investor's interest, and the auditor is forced to take the
hypothetical position of an informed investor in deciding whether an item is
material. Under this definition, an auditor as a decision maker does not
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formally take into account his own utility function. This approach seems
somewhat unrealistic, unless we accept a hypothesis that auditors are
altruistic public servants, ignoring their own utilities.
Under the model described in this paper, however, the threshold of
materiality is determined at the point where the auditor's utility from
issuing an unqualified opinion is the same as the utility from issuing a
qualified opinion. This does not mean that under the model the auditor
ignores the investor's interest in his decision making. The investor's
interest is indirectly reflected in the auditor's utility function, as the
society provides a means to regulate irresponsible auditors. If the auditor
wants to meet the responsibility entrusted upon him from the society, he
has to reflect the investor's interest in his own utility function. The
materiality concept under the model thus shifts the emphasis from the auditor
taking the hypothetical position of an investor to the one reflecting his own
utility in which the investor's interest is integrated as part of the auditor's
overall utility.
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